Reversible by design
A buy-back clause converts a sale into something closer to a long lease with a repurchase option.
Volume 03, Chapter 14
A buy-back clause is how equity, which "rarely expires," is made to expire on purpose, on terms written while everyone was still friends.
Triggers, pricing, and payment windows turn "how do I ever get my company back?" from a crisis into a procedure, closing out the complete founder-protection stack this volume built.
A buy-back clause converts a sale into something closer to a long lease with a repurchase option.
A repurchase right for ₦7,000,000 is decoration if the business can never assemble it.
Applying it to the planned exit poisons the deal from day one.
Honest valuation, tag-along, death clauses, a funded exit path, none of it is anti-investor.
Imagine Mr A wants his company fully back in year seven. Mr B agreed years ago to sell at that point, but nothing was ever written down. Can Mr A simply insist Mr B sell? He cannot. Without a clause naming exactly when, at what price, and paid how, "he agreed to sell someday" is not an agreement, it's a memory, and memories are unenforceable. This chapter is about writing that memory down before it's needed.
A buy-back clause gives the company (or the founder) the right, and sometimes the obligation, to repurchase an investor's shares at defined triggers, at a defined price or formula, over a defined payment window. It is the mechanism that makes equity reversible by design.
Chapter 3 warned that equity "rarely expires." A buy-back clause is how you make it expire, on purpose, on terms written while everyone was friends. Triggers (lock-in expiry, death, breach, departure), pricing (formula or independent valuation), and payment windows (instalments the worst month survives) turn "how do I ever get my company back?" from a crisis into a procedure. This chapter closes Volume 03 with the complete founder-protection stack, every clause from Chapters 4–13, assembled into one checklist.
Selling equity without a buy-back is like selling a room of your house: the buyer is in your corridor forever, and one day their heirs are.
A buy-back clause converts that sale into something closer to a long lease with a repurchase option: the investor genuinely owns the room, paint it, profit from it, sell it back, but the house has a written path to being whole again: at these moments, at this price, paid this way.
That's also why Chapter 4 called redeemable shares "excellent for temporary investors": the buy-back isn't an awkward renegotiation later, it's the design.
The triggers: lock expiry, death, breach, employee departure, a fixed redemption date.
TimingFair value by independent valuer, an agreed formula, or a floor/multiple hybrid.
The formulaInstalments the worst month can carry, often with modest interest on the balance.
The window| Trigger | Typical Form | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Lock-in expiry + exit notice | The founder's first-refusal step from Chapter 10's window | The planned, planned exit |
| Death of the investor | Company/founder may (or must) buy from the estate within ____ days | Prevents inheriting an unknown co-owner (Ch 9, Q9) |
| Material breach | Investor violates non-compete, confidentiality, or the agreement | The misbehaving co-owner problem |
| Employee departure | Leaver's employee shares must be sold back (good-leaver/bad-leaver pricing) | Ownership was for staff, not alumni |
| Fixed date (redeemables) | "Company may redeem any time after year 5" | The temporary-investor design |
| Method | Example Wording | Fits |
|---|---|---|
| Fair value by independent valuer | "Value per Chapter 11's methods, by a valuer both sides accept" | The default; fairest for planned exits |
| Agreed formula | "5 × average of the last 2 years' profit × the holder's %" | Predictable; no valuer fees |
| Floor/multiple hybrid | "The greater of the amount invested and fair value" | Reassures nervous first-time investors |
| Good-leaver / bad-leaver | Good leaver: fair value; bad leaver (breach): the lower of cost and fair value | Employee shares and breach triggers |
"We'll agree the price at the time" is not a formula, it's the same mistake as Chapter 10's Mistake #3, just in a different clause. Name the method now, including who appoints the valuer if you disagree.
Same law as every exit in this volume: instalments the worst month can carry (the Chapter 5 test, again). Common: 90 days for small stakes; 6–12 monthly instalments for stakes like Mr B's; up to 24 months for large ones, often with modest interest on the outstanding balance, so the delay is fair to the seller too.
Worked example, the case study's ending, done properly: Year 7, Mr B ready to exit. Fair value: business at ₦35,000,000 → his 20% = ₦7,000,000 (Chapter 10's math). Clause says 12 monthly instalments of ₦583,333. The 200 repurchased shares become treasury shares, parked, voteless, until Mr A reissues them someday to a new investor or an employee plan. Mr A owns 100% again. Mr B made ₦2,000,000 plus seven years of dividends. Nobody called a lawyer in anger. That is what "designed exit" means.
Every protective clause this volume taught, as one wall, brick by brick:
| # | Brick | Does | Chapter |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Limited company structure | The liability firewall; shares exist at all | Ch 2 |
| 2 | Honest valuation, both directions | Nobody buys in (or is bought out) on a fantasy number | Ch 11 |
| 3 | Non-voting classes for investors | Money without the steering wheel | Ch 4 |
| 4 | Keep voting % above the thresholds | 50% ordinary control; 75% supermajority; watch the >25% blocker | Ch 13 |
| 5 | Short reserved-matters list | Everyone's protection on change-everything decisions, without management-by-veto | Ch 13 |
| 6 | Lock-in period | The cement sets | Ch 10 |
| 7 | ROFR on all transfers | No strangers in the cap table | Ch 10, 13 |
| 8 | Drag + tag, as a pair | Clean whole-company sales, fair to both sizes | Ch 13 |
| 9 | Buy-back triggers, formula, window | Equity made reversible by design | this chapter |
| 10 | Death clauses, both directions | No accidental co-owners, no stranded heirs | Ch 9, Vol 24 |
| 11 | Dividend policy in writing | The reinvest-vs-distribute fight, pre-fought | Ch 9 Q14 |
| 12 | All of it signed before money moves | Your bargaining power exists exactly once | Ch 12 |
Read brick by brick, the stack isn't anti-investor, most bricks protect the investor too (honest valuation, tag-along, reserved matters, death clauses, a funded exit path). The businesses that struggle to raise money aren't the ones with firm terms; they're the ones with no terms (the manual's very first sentence). A founder who can walk an investor through this stack sounds like someone whose company is safe to own a slice of.
The right to repurchase ₦7,000,000 of shares is decoration if the business can never assemble ₦7,000,000. Instalment windows (Q3), a small yearly reserve (Volume 07's emergency fund), or insurance (for death triggers) make the right real.
No clause = no right. You cannot compel a co-owner to sell "because it's my company." That sentence, spoken in year six, is why this chapter exists in year zero.
Punishing pricing on the planned exit (lock-in expiry) poisons the deal from day one. Punishing terms are for breach, fair value is for friends.
Shares repurchased but the cap table, share register, and filings never updated (Ch 12, Mistake #4). The painful who-owns-what dig, self-inflicted.
Assemble your complete ownership design on two pages: