Value-% isn't voting-%
Non-voting classes mean a founder's real steering power can exceed their ownership share.
Volume 03, Chapter 13
Drag-along lets the majority require the minority to sell when the company is sold. Tag-along lets the minority join the sale on the same terms as the majority. Either way, everyone sells at the same price.
Reserved matters protect everyone by requiring extra consent for the handful of decisions that could change everything, but the list must stay short or it becomes management by veto.
Non-voting classes mean a founder's real steering power can exceed their ownership share.
It blocks every supermajority decision, a blocking minority handed out casually is a lasting veto.
A bloated list turns a 20% investor into a co-driver, operational items don't belong on it.
Every new share issue moves everyone relative to 50%, 75%, and 25%.
Imagine Mr A owns 68% of MANIAC MINDZ's shares by value, and yet controls 82% of the vote. Both numbers are true at the same time. The gap exists because owning a slice of the value and owning a slice of the steering wheel are two different things, and a founder who understands the difference can stay firmly in control even while giving away a large share of the company's worth.
are the decision-power attached to shares. Voting thresholds are the percentages needed to pass different kinds of decisions. Reserved matters are the short list of decisions that need special approval no matter who holds the votes. Drag-along and tag-along are the two clauses that govern what happens to everyone's shares when someone sells.
Owning shares gives you a slice of the value (Chapter 3); voting shares give you a slice of the steering wheel. Ordinary decisions typically need more than 50% of votes; major ones need a supermajority (often 75%). Reserved matters protect everyone by requiring extra consent for the handful of decisions that could change everything. And when a buyer appears for the whole company: drag-along lets a majority compel minorities to sell (so the buyer can get 100%), while tag-along lets minorities join a majority's sale on the same terms (so they're never left behind with a stranger).
Picture the company as a bus.
Pass ordinary decisions: approve accounts, appoint managers, day-to-day resolutions.
Ordinary controlPass major changes: amend the Articles, restructure share capital.
SupermajorityCan block supermajority decisions, a "blocking minority."
Blocking powerChange anything, including the agreements themselves.
Total control| Voting Power | What It Typically Means |
|---|---|
| > 50% | Pass ordinary decisions: approve accounts, appoint managers, day-to-day resolutions |
| ≥ 75% (typical supermajority) | Pass major changes: amend the Articles, restructure share capital |
| > 25% | Can block supermajority decisions, a "blocking minority" |
| 100% | Change anything, including the agreements themselves |
Two truths founders miss:
A reserved matter is a decision carved out of normal voting, requiring a higher threshold, or a specific person's written consent, regardless of share math. The typical list:
| Reserved Matter | Why It's on the List |
|---|---|
| Selling the company or its major assets | The everything-decision |
| Issuing new shares | Controls dilution of every owner |
| Borrowing above ₦______ | Debt can sink all shareholders (Chapter 5) |
| Changing the nature of the business | Investors funded a tailoring shop, not a casino |
| Appointing/removing directors; changing founder's role | Who runs the machine |
| Declaring dividends outside the agreed policy | Guards the Q14 answer |
| Related-party deals above ₦______ | Stops owners quietly paying themselves via side contracts |
Reserved matters cut both ways, and that's their elegance. They're how a minority investor (even a non-voting one, via consent rights) is protected from a founder who could otherwise vote through anything. And they're how a founder is protected from a future voting majority. The founder's counter-discipline: keep the list short. Every added item is a steering lever handed partly away, a bloated reserved-matters list turns a 20% investor into a co-driver.
Watch for reserved-matters lists that include operational decisions, hiring staff, setting prices, buying fabric. That's not protection; that's management by veto, and it defeats the entire non-voting structure. Reserved matters belong to the change-everything category only.
Years later, a large clothing group offers to buy 100% of MANIAC MINDZ at ₦50,000 per share. Two clauses decide whether that sale can happen cleanly, and who it protects:
| Drag-Along | Tag-Along | |
|---|---|---|
| Who triggers it | The majority (e.g., holders of 75% or more) accepting a genuine offer | A minority holder, when the majority is selling |
| What it does | Compels all other shareholders to sell on the same terms | Entitles the minority to join the sale on the same terms |
| Who it protects | The majority, and the buyer, who usually wants 100% or nothing | The minority, from being left behind co-owning with a stranger |
| In the story | Mr A (with Mr C) accepts; Mr B must sell his 200 shares at ₦50,000 too, he cannot block the deal to demand a higher price for himself | If Mr A sold only his own majority stake to the group, Mr B could insist his shares be bought at the same ₦50,000 |
| The fairness lock | "Same terms", the dragged minority gets exactly the majority's price | "Same terms", no discount for the tagging minority |
Without drag-along: one 5% holder can block a sale everyone else wants, or demand extra money to cooperate. Without tag-along: a founder can sell control and vanish, leaving minorities stuck co-owning with an unknown new boss. Most balanced agreements include both, at thresholds everyone can live with (the template does).
Drag = the majority pulls you out the door. Tag = you grab the majority's coat on their way out. Both walk through the door at the same price.
| Protection | Lives In | Protects | Against |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voting thresholds | Articles + law | Whoever holds votes | A minority blocking everything / the majority forcing everything through (at 75%) |
| Non-voting classes | Ch 4 share design | Founder's steering | Money buying the wheel |
| Reserved matters | Shareholders' Agreement | Everyone | The change-everything decisions |
| Blocking minority (>25% votes) | Arithmetic | A large minority | Supermajority changes |
| ROFR | Shareholders' Agreement | Insiders | Strangers buying in (Ch 10) |
| Drag-along | Shareholders' Agreement | Majority + buyer | A minority blocking a sale |
| Tag-along | Shareholders' Agreement | Minority | Being left behind |
| Buy-back rights | Ch 14 | Founder | Permanent unwanted co-owners |
68% of shares is not 68% of votes when classes differ. Always work out the voting cap table separately (Section 3).
30% voting to an investor "because they asked" quietly hands them a veto on every major change, forever.
Approval needed to hire a cutter = a silent partner who isn't silent. Keep the list to change-everything items.
One-sided door clauses breed resentment and litigation. They're a matched pair, install both.
Every new round moves everyone relative to 50/75/25. Re-run the voting table after every share issue, Chapter 11's two-rounds-ahead rule.